Ok, I’m kicking myself for missing Catherine MacKinnon the other day – I seem to have had a bout of disorganisation in the last week…

I however manage to see an interesting paper presented by an academic named Tziporah Kasachkoff from Ben Gurion University (does that mean I was supposed to boycott her talk? Like Asher, I don’t believe in boycotts, in most circumstances anyway) on whether moral judgements are the result of reasoning.

She took issue with another academic named Haidt, and his theory of social intuitionism. Simply stated that the theory holds that  ‘people are reactive and affective’ – in all but exceptional cases we don’t think, but merely react on the basis of prejudices. It is rarely that decisions are properly considered in terms of their moral consequences, and in exceptional cases that the first principles that inform these decisions are deeply considered, at least outside of philosophy. It seems that the theory as advocated by Haidt is only partially right; that people, over time, can have their deep principles questioned, molded and changed, and that non-reactive thinking occurs among non-philosophers, but rarely.

I do have to admit that I’ve been somewhat intimidated by the philosophy department here – even with a philosophy major I feel completely out of my depth in talks… I don’t know if the above makes sense.
Anyhow, the reason I mention this is that I’ve been thinking a lot about moral judgements made by politicians and members of human rights focussed organisations. Specifically, how people view particular moral situations and then construct judgements based on those perceptions. And more particularly, how do people adopt conclusions about actions that stand in complete opposition to their stated beliefs?

I came to the ANU with the intention of investigating reasons for differences between Australian and New Zealand foreign policy towards Indonesia. I’ve had to abandon that topic, because while there are differences, they’re slight, to the point where New Zealand now echoes Australian foreign policy. The most significant period of differences in the last ten years was in 2000-2002, a period that saw the (re)radicalisation of Phil Goff after participation in the parliamentary observers group that witnessed the actions of the Indonesian military in East Timor, the influence of Matt Robson and the Alliance, and the general willingness to speak freely that comes to a new government, unaccustomed to the comforts and privileges of power. The environment in Indonesia has changed, but a number of events in the last few years stand out against the warming relationship. The ongoing imprisonment, torture and killing of civilians and human rights advocates is just one salient issue.

I’ve come to a preliminary conclusion that for the most part moral judgements made by people in positions of power are made on the fly, without deep consideration of the issues, and that they are made with reference to a number of different contradictory principles – those that trouble in a particular situation are discarded to avoid internal dissonance. These people do sincerely believe the grand words they say about human rights, but when challenged on their actions, revert to arguments that appeal to other justifications. This demonstrates an unwillingness to accept internal dissonance/self-contradiction, which is an attempt to straighten out inconsistency between judgement and the facts. Not so much liars, as people who’s truth is selected according to the occasion.

I’m presently of the opinion that a person’s thinking is a part of that person, insomuch as people’s brains are malleable physical objects, constructed and altered by mental activity. An inability to challenge one’s constitution would therefore be expected – brains with no strongly held ideas wouldn’t be able to cope very well.

Those are just a few ideas, I hope they make some sense…

(I use Helen Clark and Phil Goff as my thinking examples: their stated commitments to human rights stands in apparent contradiction to many of their actions.)